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in the Tangi Valley of Afghanistan’s 
Wardak Province, 19 August 2009. 
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IT IS AN oft-cited maxim that in all the conflicts of the past century, the United States has refought its last war. A number of analysts and 
journalists have mentioned the war in Vietnam recently in connection with 
Afghanistan.1 Perhaps fearful of taking this analogy too far, most have backed 
away from it. They should not—the Vietnam War is less a metaphor for 
the conflict in Afghanistan than it is a template. For eight years, the United 
States has engaged in an almost exact political and military reenactment of 
the Vietnam War, and the lack of self-awareness of the repetition of events 
50 years ago is deeply disturbing. 
The Obama Administration deliberately took ownership of the Afghani-
stan war in its first days in office by sending more troops and ordering 
multiple strategic reviews. In October, as this article is being written, the 
Obama Administration is engaged in a very public strategic review fol-
lowing both a grim assessment from the President’s hand picked theatre 
commander, General Stanley McChrystal, and an embarrassing election 
fiasco in Afghanistan. President Obama certainly knows, as Presidents 
Johnson and Nixon did in similar circumstances, that the choice of alter-
natives now is between bad and worse. There is general agreement today, 
as indeed there was before the Diem Coup in 1963, that the war is going 
badly. Attacks of all types in Afghanistan have increased each year since 
2003 and are up dramatically in 2009, the deadliest year yet for American 
forces. The Kabul government is so corrupt, dysfunctional, and incompetent 
that even its election rigging is buffoonish. The U.S. troop commitment 
has escalated steadily, a pattern familiar from the Vietnam War, and now 
the President must contemplate a request for another 40,000 U.S. troops or, 
in the words of General McChrystal’s classified assessment leaked to the 
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Washington Post, face “mission failure.”2 What-
ever the outcomes of the President’s decision and 
the current Afghan election in the next few weeks, 
however, they will not affect the extraordinary 
similarity of the two conflicts.
The superficial parallels between the Afghanistan 
and Vietnam conflicts are eerie enough. Both insur-
gencies were and are rurally based. In both cases, 
80 percent of the population was and is rural, with 
national literacy hovering around 10 percent. Both 
insurgencies were and are ethnically cohesive and 
exclusive. In both cases, the insurgents enjoyed 
safe sanctuary behind a long, rugged and unclose-
able border, which conventional U.S. forces could 
not and cannot cross, where the enemy had and has 
uncontested political power. Both countries were 
wracked by decades of European imperial aggres-
sion (France, the Soviet Union), both improbably 
won their David-versus-Goliath wars against the 
invaders, and both experienced a decade of North-
South civil war afterwards: all producing genera-
tions of experienced and highly skilled fighters and 
combat commanders. 
Both countries have spectacularly inhospitable 
and impassable terrain and few roads, limiting the 
value of U.S. superiority in motor vehicles and 
making tanks irrelevant and artillery immobile. 
Such terrain forces a reliance on airpower for fire 
support and helicopters for personnel movement 
and resupply. Both wars are on the Asian landmass, 
thousands of miles from the United States, which 
requires super-attenuated logistics lines, although in 
Afghanistan, unlike Vietnam, where the U.S. Navy 
performed extremely well, there is of course no 
Cam Rahn Bay, no Mekong Delta, and no coastline, 
largely limiting the huge advantage of U.S. naval 
power to SEALs and Seabees. 
As in most rural peasant insurgencies, in both 
cases, poorly equipped guerrillas lived and hid 
among the people. Neither the Viet Cong (VC) 
nor the Taliban were or are popular. Support for 
either to be the national rulers was and is below 15 
percent.3  In both wars the enemy deeply infiltrated 
our bases, and forced interpreters to inform them 
of our every move and word.4 In both countries, 
heavy-handed and culturally offensive U.S. troop 
behavior and indiscriminate use of fire support 
turned rural villages into enemy recruiting centers. 
North Vietnam received money, weapons and sup-
port from the Soviet Union; the Taliban receives 
it from the Pakistani Army (the ISI) and wealthy 
Saudis. In June 2009, the U.S. Army even rein-
stituted the “body count” as a metric of success.5 
(General McChrystal revoked this on taking com-
mand, but the mentality remains.)
Those are just a few of the surface symmetries. 
The real parallels are far more profound. There 
are differences, to be sure, but most, if exam-
ined, are more atmospheric than structural. And 
unfortunately, most are distinct disadvantages 
for the United States. Afghanistan is a patchwork 
of ethnic groups, unlike Vietnam, with almost 
no national sense of identity or nationalism. In 
Vietnam, the United States had complete control 
over the prosecution of the war; in Afghanistan, 
the “war by coalition” is hampered by fractured 
internal lines of authority and national caveats and 
rules of engagement that undermine unity of com-
mand. In Vietnam, the enemy was monolithic; the 
insurgency in Afghanistan is a complex network 
of networks, and that is bad news.6 Afghanistan is 
not one insurgency but several connected ones, and 
generalizations about U.S. enemies in Afghanistan 
are misleading and often counterproductive. 
It is here, in the nature of the enemy, that the 
similarities begin to become far more troubling, not 
in their motivations, which are clearly different, but 
in our persistent institutional misreading of their 
motivations. In Vietnam, an intense and pervasive 
narrative of nationalism and reunification motivated 
the enemy, but the United States obtusely insisted 
on casting the war as a fight against the spread of 
communism. However, the North Vietnamese Army 
A CH-47 Chinook helicopter lifts off a slingload of ammuni-
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(NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) were not fighting 
for communism. They were fighting for Vietnam. 
We were fighting against communism, but the enemy 
wasn’t fighting for it. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the 
enemy has created a pervasive national discourse, in 
this case of religious jihad. Senior U.S. and NATO 
officials, however, continue to misread the funda-
mental narrative of the enemy they are fighting, 
determined in this case to wage a secular campaign 
against an enemy who is fighting a religious war. 
The motivations of many individual foot soldiers 
are baser, of course, ranging from revenge to crimi-
nal to simply mercenary, but that is irrelevant. The 
enemy has succeeded in establishing jihad as their 
pervasive, overarching narrative. Consistently over 
time and space, all of their remarkably sophisticated 
information operations uniformly hammer home 
this religious message of jihad. Virtually all Taliban 
leaders, from senior military and political leaders 
down to sub-commanders at the district level, are 
mullahs.7 The implications of this have not yet sunk 
in. We are fighting a counterinsurgency; the enemy 
is fighting a jihad. But the intersection of how insur-
gencies end and how jihads end is historically nil, 
and talk of “negotiating with the Taliban” to find a 
political solution, as if the Taliban were some sort of 
unified secular political organization, is profoundly 
naive. You cannot negotiate with God’s divine will, 
and in Afghanistan you only seek negotiations when 
you’re losing in order to get better surrender terms. 
By misunderstanding the basic nature of the enemy, 
the United States is fighting the wrong war again, 
just as we did in Vietnam. It is hard to defeat an 
enemy you do not understand.
This problem would be fixable if the U.S. political 
and military apparatus could examine the enemy 
outside of the pervasively secular discourse cre-
ated by the dominant U.S. intelligence agencies 
and without fear of being seen as waging a “war on 
Islam.” This shift in thinking is difficult, but pos-
sible. However, the two really profound similarities 
between the two wars are virtually unfixable. The 
first of these is the political problem of legitimacy. 
Indeed, the greatest challenge from North Vietnam 
then, and the Taliban today, is not combat power 
but legitimacy.8 
The Sine Qua Non of 
Counterinsurgency: Legitimacy
“Legitimacy” is a word that is being bandied 
about a lot recently in Washington. After eight 
years, pundits, talking heads, and government offi-
cials alike have suddenly discovered the “legitimacy 
of governance issue.” Unfortunately, none of them 
seems to understand the real one. The issue is not 
the moral meltdown of President Hamid Karzai 
over the last six months, nor his presiding over 
an absurdly (and unnecessarily) rigged election, 
nor that he is seen as illegitimate afterward by the 
majority of Afghans. The real issue is that President 
Karzai was seen as illegitimate before the election. 
The political disaster in August, which the deputy 
head of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 
Peter Galbraith, called a “train wreck,” merely 
shifted Afghan public perception of Karzai from 
contempt to scorn. Afghans are famously polite; 
western opinion polls show only what Afghans 
think the questioner wants to hear, as their culture 
demands, not what they actually think. 
   Why does this matter to the military? Because 
experts largely agree that a government seen as 
legitimate by 85 to 90 percent of the population is 
the sine qua non of success against an insurgency. As 
Kalev Sepp demonstrated statistically, if you don’t 
have it, you lose.9 (This should not be conflated with 
popularity: having legitimacy to rule is quite distinct 
from being popular.) Hamid Karzai is now well 
below 50 percent, and probably closer to 30 percent. 
Insurrections are hardly new phenomena in 
Afghanistan.10 Previous Afghan leaders have 
had varying degrees of success in subduing rural 
religious insurrection. The degree of that success 
depended on how much of the population viewed 
the regime as legitimate and how much it stayed 
out of the daily lives of the people. And Afghan 
history demonstrates conclusively that legitimacy of 
governance comes exclusively from two immutable 
sources: dynastic (monarchies and tribal patriar-
chies) and religious, or sometimes both.11 These 
equate to the traditional and religious sources cited 
by noted sociologist Max Weber.12 
…the intersection of how 
insurgencies end and how 
jihads end is historically nil…
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Unfortunately, the Karzai government owes its 
only claim to legitimacy to Weber’s third source, the 
legal one (e.g., western-style elections and the rule 
of law). This has no historical precedent as a basis 
for legitimizing Afghan rule at all, however, and the 
notion that the West can apply it to Afghan society 
like a coat of paint is simply wishful thinking. In 
essence, the Karzai government is illegitimate 
because it is elected.13 
An American cannot declare himself king and 
expect Americans to see him as legitimate: monar-
chy is not a source of legitimacy of governance in 
America. Similarly, a man cannot be voted president 
in Afghanistan and expect Afghans to perceive him 
as legitimate: democracy is not a source of legiti-
macy in Afghanistan. And any illusions a minority 
of Afghans might have had about the workings of 
democracy since 2001 have been thoroughly dis-
pelled by a dysfunctional parliament and the August 
election debacle. Elections don’t make democra-
cies; democracies make elections.
This problem of illegitimacy is especially acute 
at the village level of rural Pashtun society, where 
dynastic and religious authority has been unques-
tioned for over a thousand years.14 The widespread 
perception among Afghans that the Karzai govern-
ment is illegitimate—because it lacks any tradi-
tional or religious legitimacy—predates Karzai’s 
August disgrace by five years.  
The revisionist camp of Vietnam historians has 
made the argument that by 1972, U.S. military 
forces in the field in South Vietnam had succeeded 
in temporarily halting the North Vietnamese effort 
to reunite the country by force, despite the huge 
handicaps imposed on the military by the political 
parameters of a limited war.15 This perspective is 
true in a narrow sense. But as North Vietnamese 
Colonel Tu famously said to Colonel Harry Sum-
mers in Hanoi in 1972, it is also irrelevant. All the 
military effort was tragically for naught, because 
politically, in Saigon, there was no there there. The 
completely illegitimate national government never 
had the support of the rural population. (It is also 
sobering to recall that this temporary stalemate was 
achieved by up to 535,000 U.S. troops—about eight 
times the number in Afghanistan by the end of 2009, 
in a country which would fit inside Afghanistan four 
times with room for a few mountain ranges left over, 
at a cost of 58,159 American and as many as four 
million Vietnamese lives.)16  
Eric Bergerud, one of the Vietnam War’s best 
historians, has written that— 
The Government of Vietnam (GVN) lacked 
legitimacy with the rural peasantry, the 
largest segment of the population...The peas-
antry perceived the GVN to be aloof, corrupt, 
and inefficient...South Vietnam’s urban elite 
possessed the outward manifestations of a 
foreign culture...more importantly, this small 
group held most of the wealth and power in 
a poor nation, and the attitude of the ruling 
elite toward the rural population was, at best, 
paternalistic and, at worst, predatory.17 
As Jeffrey Record further notes, “the fundamental 
political obstacle to an enduring American suc-
cess in Vietnam [was] a politically illegitimate, 
militarily feckless, and thoroughly corrupted South 
Vietnamese client regime.”18 Substitute the word 
“Afghanistan” for the words “South Vietnam” 
in these quotations and the descriptions apply 
precisely to today’s government in Kabul. Like 
Afghanistan, South Vietnam at the national level 
was a massively corrupt collection of self-interested 
warlords, many of them deeply implicated in the 
profitable opium trade, with almost nonexistent 
legitimacy outside the capital city. The purely 
military gains achieved at such terrible cost in our 
nation’s blood and treasure in Vietnam never came 
close to exhausting the enemy’s manpower pool 
or his will to fight, and simply could not be sus-
tained politically by a venal and incompetent set of 
dysfunctional state institutions where self-interest 
was the order of the day. This is the first of the two 
deeply profound replications of the Vietnam War 
in Afghanistan, and one which the U.S. military 
should consider carefully before putting its full 
weight behind further escalation.
Nor was Nixon’s “Vietnamization” of that con-
flict or “Afghanization” of this one ever a viable 
option. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954, “Strong 
…the Karzai government is 
illegitimate because it is elected.
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and stable governments and societies are necessary 
to support the creation of strong armies.”19 Vietnam, 
like Afghanistan, lacked both. In both cases, a politi-
cally appointed and promoted officer corps—more 
motivated by profit or loyalties to patrons than by 
patriotism—hobbled and hobbles the army.20 The 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), like the 
Afghan National Army (ANA), was wracked by 
a high annual attrition rate, which the U.S. Army 
obscured in both wars by providing misleading 
statistics referring purely to the numbers of basic 
recruits trained. The Pentagon continues to put 
out the (true but irrelevant) figure of 90,000 ANA 
soldiers “trained and equipped” since May 2002, 
not mentioning that perhaps 32,000 combat troops 
remain present for duty today.21 Like the ARVN, 
ANA recruit quality is poor, virtually all are illiter-
ate, readiness is low even by the lenient standards 
imposed by pressure to show progress, and drug 
use is a large and growing problem. Behind the 
smoke and mirrors, the “official” annual desertion 
rate is down from a high in 2005 of 30 percent to 
“only” 10 percent, but the AWOL definition hides 
a lot of the desertion. Reenlistment is below 50 
percent, so with five-year contracts, another 12 per-
cent of the force quits every year. With casualties, 
sickness, etc., 25 percent of the ANA evaporates 
annually. The Army knows the ANA cannot ever 
grow larger than 100,000 men, double its present 
size, because before then annual accession will 
equal annual losses.22 Projections of a 134,000-man 
force by 2010 or a 240,000-man ANA in the future 
are absurd. Another sad parallel is the fact that in 
both wars, the U.S. military advisory effort was the 
absolute lowest priority for personnel assignment 
within the U.S. Army. Since May 2002, the fill-rate 
for ANA embedded trainers has averaged around 
50 percent of identified billets, and most of them 
have been pulled from noncombat specialties (like 
medical or logistics) to undergo remedial combat 
skills training at Fort Riley themselves before 
being sent to teach combat skills to the ANA. Most 
importantly, the ANA and the ARVN both became 
psychologically crippled by years of watching from 
the back seat as the Americans took charge of the 
war, and neither army learned to operate on its own 
or ever developed the ability to supply itself or hold 
the gains U.S. troops achieved. The U.S. Army likes 
to trumpet operations where the ANA “took the 
lead,” again neglecting to mention that virtually all 
of these are in the combat-light northern areas, and 
almost none of them in the combat-intensive south.
In short, absent the highly improbable self-
transformation of the Afghan government into a 
competent, legitimate, and relatively uncorrupt 
institution in much less time than the South Viet-
namese government had and failed to achieve the 
same feat, identical conditions for political and 
indigenous army failure will exist in Afghanistan 
regardless of any foreign military success. History 
also shows decisively that governments sustained 
on the points of foreign bayonets in Kabul do not 
long outlive their departures.
The Critical Difference 
There is, however, one critical positive difference 
between Afghanistan and Vietnam—one which 
might salvage the war if decision makers grasp it. 
As we have argued, the central task is establishing 
legitimacy of governance to deny political control 
to the Taliban. In Afghanistan, as in South Vietnam, 
at the national level, this is simply impossible in the 
time available. It is beyond our power to change an 
entire society. However, in Afghanistan, this critical 
legitimacy does not have to be national; it can be 
local. Governance in the rural areas of Afghanistan 
has historically been decentralized and tribal, and 
stability has come from a complex, interlocking web 
of tribal networks.23 If Western leaders can think out-
side the box created by the Treaty of Westphalia and 
embrace non-Western forms of legitimacy, they could 
possibly reverse the descending trajectory of the war. 
Instead of focusing energy and resources on building 
a sand castle at the water’s edge, as we did repeatedly 
in Saigon after each new coup, we have argued for 
years that we should focus on rebuilding the tradi-
tional local legitimacy of governance in the existing 
networks of tribal leaders.24 A culturally adept policy 
would seek to reestablish stability in rural Afghani-
stan by putting it back the way it was before the Sovi-
ets invaded in 1979. This means re-empowering the 
Nor was Nixon’s “Vietnamization” 
of that conflict or “Afghanization” 
of this one ever a viable option. 
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village elders as contrasted with the current policy of 
trying to further marginalize them with local elections 
(and thus more local illegitimacy). Recent research 
has demonstrated conclusively that the Community 
Development Councils set up by the United Nations 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
in parallel to the tribal system increase instability 
and conflict, rather than reducing it.25 Reestablishing 
local legitimacy of governance is, in fact, the one 
remaining chance to pull something resembling our 
security goals in Afghanistan out of the fatally flawed 
Bonn Process and the yawning jaws of defeat. The 
tragedy of Vietnam was that there were no political 
solutions. The tragedy of Afghanistan is that there is 
a political solution, but we keep ignoring it in favor 
of trying to force them to be like us. 
The Crossing Axis:  
Strategic Military Failure
If the parallels stopped there, the analysis would 
be grim enough. But in Afghanistan, exactly as 
The tragedy of Afghanistan is that 
there is a political solution, but 
we keep ignoring it…
Village elders running for city council hold up numbers as locals cast votes 
during an election in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. Such elections 
set up highly counterproductive and destabilizing parallel governance bod-
ies which further erode and undermine the authority and power of the local 




















in Vietnam, the political problem of 
illegitimacy makes a fatal nexus with 
the military institutional culture of 
Big Army, and the result is incoher-
ence. And that is the second of the two 
deeply disturbing structural parallels 
between the two conflicts.
Since 2002, the prosecution of the 
war in Afghanistan—at all levels—has 
been based on an implied strategy of 
attrition via clearing operations virtu-
ally identical to those pursued in Viet-
nam. In Vietnam, they were dubbed 
“search and destroy missions;” in 
Afghanistan they are called “clearing 
operations” and “compound searches,” 
but the purpose is the same—to find 
easily replaced weapons or clear a tiny, 
arbitrarily chosen patch of worthless 
ground for a short period, and then 
turn it over to indigenous security 
forces who can’t hold it, and then go do it again 
somewhere else. The great majority of our most 
precious resource in Afghanistan, the soldier-hour, 
has been wasted in this way since January 2002. 
Not surprisingly, with a troop-per-square mile ratio 
by the end of this year which will reach 1/32nd of 
that in Vietnam, it is not working in Afghanistan 
either. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, the enemy’s 
manpower pool for troops and tactical leaders is 
not his Achilles heel, because, as in Vietnam, the 
enemy can replace casualties at a far higher rate 
than we can ever inflict them. For eight years in 
Afghanistan we have fought exactly the way the 
enemy expected and hoped we would. The Taliban 
have read Vietnam history, too. (In both wars the 
Army has badly underestimated the enemy’s intel-
ligence, another tragic parallel.) 
As Russell Weigley brilliantly documented, war 
of attrition is the American Way of War.26 As in 
Vietnam, a war of attrition in Afghanistan is doomed 
to failure. General McChrystal is the first American 
commander since the war began to understand that 
protecting the people, not chasing illiterate teenage 
boys with guns around the countryside, is the basic 
principle of counterinsurgency. Yet four months into 
his command, little seems to have changed, except 
for an eight-year overdue order to stop answering 
the enemy’s prayers by blowing up compounds 
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with air strikes to martyr more of the teenage boys. 
(Which the Germans in Konduz ignored to blow 
up two tanker trucks recently and killed another 40 
or 50 civilians.) War of attrition is still the default 
position. Watching the war in Afghanistan unfold is 
still painfully reminiscent of watching the nightly 
Vietnam War newscasts with their daily reminders 
of the same “strategy of tactics.” Few old enough 
to remember the Vietnam War on TV could have 
watched the footage of Operation Kanjar showing 
the Vietnam era CH-47 helicopters clattering into 
Helmand Province with 4,000 Marines aboard in 
July 2009 to carry out yet another clearing mission 
without experiencing a sense of déjà vu. Yes, the 
Marines say this time they are staying to protect 
the people, but for how many years? Five? Ten?
Senior officers today often repeat the catechisms 
that “there is no military solution,” and that we 
cannot “kill or capture” our way to victory in 
Afghanistan. Some officers say the Army has gotten 
better at counterinsurgency in the last five years. 
Perhaps so, but there’s little evidence coming out 
of Afghanistan to prove it. Big Army talks the talk 
of counterinsurgency but still walks the walk of 
attrition. Last year, for example, an Army Special 
Forces officer returning from a year of duty in 
southern Afghanistan told us that although he had 
pacified his district by building a relationship of 
trust with the elders, and had the lowest number of 
IED attacks and ambushes in his province for the 
past six months, he was rated the lowest of all the 
officers in his unit for promotion because he had 
the fewest number of “kills” during his tour of duty. 
If the U.S. Army’s own counterinsurgency branch 
promotes on the basis of attrition, it is a safe bet that 
the 82nd Airborne is not spending the majority of 
its pre-deployment training period learning to speak 
Pashto, sip tea properly, and understand Pashtun-
wali. In a revenge-based culture, we’re still kicking 
in doors, violating Pashtun honor codes by search-
ing compounds and women, and blowing up civil-
ians just as we have been since 2002. To paraphrase 
John Paul Vann, we haven’t been in Afghanistan for 
eight years, we’ve been in Afghanistan for one year 
eight times.27 The Army’s embedded DNA code to 
“find, fix, and finish the enemy,” the article of faith 
For eight years…we have 
fought exactly the way the 
enemy expected and 
hoped we would.
A Marine from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, moves a Viet Cong 
suspect to the rear during a search and clear operation held 





A U.S. Marine Corps sergeant clears a compound during a  
patrol in Nawa district, Helmand province, Afghanistan,  
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for General Westmoreland in Vietnam (famously 
called “the Concept”) was, if anything, reinforced 
by the Vietnam experience.28 As in Vietnam, the 
U.S. Army in Afghanistan is still subconsciously 
determined to fight the kind of war of maneuver it 
likes to fight, rather than adapt its tactics to the kind 
of war it is actually in. 
Less than five percent of U.S. forces in Afghani-
stan today have reconstruction (called “Pacifica-
tion” in the Vietnam War) as their primary mission, 
another statistic photocopied from Vietnam. The 
percentage of personnel assigned to provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRTs) or supporting them is 
almost exactly the same as the percentage assigned 
to village pacification efforts like the bungled 
Operation Sunrise and the Civil Operations Revo-
lutionary Development Support (CORDS) program 
in Vietnam. And as in Vietnam, civil affairs mis-
sions are the lowest priority for assets like force 
protection and MRAPs. Since many of the U.S. 
PRTs in the south were dismembered and rolled 
together with maneuver forces in 2005, restrictive 
force protection rules of engagement have meant 
there have always been enough assets for another 
compound search, but rarely enough for the “low-
priority” inspection of a school construction project 
in another district. This suggests a military culture 
long on theory, short on practical execution, and 
largely amnesiac of its own history. 
Ironically, General McChrystal’s new strategy in 
Afghanistan of pulling out of rural areas to protect 
the bigger population centers is exactly the one the 
enemy would choose for us if he could. Afghans 
living in the larger towns are mostly merchants 
and small businessmen, and they are the very last 
citizens, besides the Hazaras, who want to see the 
Taliban come back into power. The Taliban know 
the urban garrisons will fall one by one like ripe 
apples once they control the rural areas and sur-
round them, as they did when they first came to 
power in 1996. It is the rural people you have to 
protect most in a rural insurgency, not the towns-
people. The Soviets learned this the hard way in 
Afghanistan from 1979-1989, when they too held all 
the populations centers and none of the countryside, 
and were soundly beaten. As Marshal Akhromeyev 
remarked in 1986, “We control Kabul and the pro-
vincial centers, but…we have lost the battle for the 
Afghan people.”29
Even more ironically, this same critique was 
essentially published in the Army’s (in)famous 
Program for the Pacification and Long Term Devel-
opment of South Vietnam (PROVN) report in 1966, 
which, as Andrew Krepinevich has documented, was 
covered up by an Army which wasn’t interested.30
Provincial Déjà Vu
Another identical replication of the Vietnam War 
in Afghanistan is the tragic mistake of administer-
ing the country and prosecuting the war from the 
provincial level. As Eric Bergerud wrote of the 
Vietnam War: 
Most political initiatives and many of the 
military efforts aimed at destroying the…
insurgency in South Vietnam were either 
planned or controlled at the province level. 
American combat divisions normally estab-
lished their tactical areas of responsibility, 
and thus the course of their operations, on 
the basis of provincial boundaries.31 
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, however, these 
provincial boundaries were artificial administrative 
constructs that did not, and do not today, correspond 
to any political reality on the ground. Provincial 
boundaries in Afghanistan are meaningless, with 
no correlation to any local identities or power 
structures. They resemble familiar state, county, 
provincial and Länder boundaries in the United 
States, Britain, France and Germany, however, so 
they were made the fundamental structural basis for 
military and political effort in Afghanistan.
Pashtun identity is rooted in a level of social 
organization further down, in the woleswali (the 
district) and the alaqadari (subdistrict). Few Pash-
tuns other than the handful of educated urban elites 
with whom Westerners interact have any sense of 
identity beyond this level, which is almost entirely 
clan based. No Pashtun would ever identify himself 
by his province, where we are attempting to impose 
external governance. Rural Pashtuns thus have no 
perceivable political interest in this keystone of inter-
national military and political effort in Afghanistan. 
One of the most common (and most fatuous) 
banalities repeated by a post-2001 crop of “security 
analysts” about the Pashtun tribal areas is that they 
are “ungoverned spaces.” This is not true. The tribal 
areas of Afghanistan are alternatively governed 
spaces: they are governed, as they have been for a 
10 November-December 2009  MILITARY REVIEW 
millennium, by tribal law. Tribal law, implemented 
by the tribal elders of each clan, resolves some 95 
percent of all disputes through the mechanism of 
the jirga, or council.32 When it is operating in the 
traditional manner, the village mullah is an integral 
part of the jirga, a spiritual advisor who ensures that 
the outcome conforms to the dictates of Islam, but 
the elders lead the process. 
When it is in equilibrium, rural Afghan society 
is a triangle of power formed by the tribal elders, 
the mullahs, and the government.33 Interestingly, 
these correspond exactly to Weber’s three sources 
of legitimacy of governance.34 In times of peace and 
stability, the longest side of the triangle is that of the 
tribal elders, constituted through the jirga system. 
The next longest, but much shorter side is that of the 
mullahs. Traditionally and historically, the govern-
ment side is a microscopic short segment. However, 
after 30 years of blowback from the Islamization of 
the Pashtun begun by General Zia in Pakistan and 
accelerated by the Soviet-Afghan War, the religious 
side of the triangle has become the longest side.35
Conceptually, what the West has attempted to do 
in Afghanistan since 2001, enshrined in the fatally 
flawed Bonn Process, is make the government side 
of the triangle the longest through the policy of 
“extending the reach of the central government.”36 
However, every time a secular central government 
has attempted this, as did King Amanullah in the 
1920s and the communists in the 1970s, it has 
resulted in a violent, conservative rural revolution 
led by mullahs and framed in terms of jihad that 
brought down the government. It is not a coinci-
dence that the current conservative rural insurgency 
in Afghanistan led by mullahs and framed in terms 
of jihad has grown stronger and more virulent 
each year since 2002 when this misguided effort at 
revolutionary social engineering became U.S. and 
UN policy.37 “Extending the reach of the central 
government” is precisely the wrong strategy in 
Afghanistan because it is exactly what the rural 
people do not want. The level of coercive social 
change that would be required to actually imple-
ment this radical social revolution in Afghanistan 
is beyond our national means. As Jeffrey Clark 
observed in his final analysis of what went wrong 
in Vietnam, “It was simply beyond the capacity 
Marines of H Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, move 
along rice paddy dikes in pursuit of the Viet Cong, 1965.
“Extending the reach of the central 
government” is precisely the wrong 
strategy in Afghanistan…
Members of a 6th Marines “weapons company” crossing an  
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of one power to reform and reshape the society 
of another.”38 “Extending the reach of the central 
government” is not the solution to the insurgency, 
it is one of the primary causes.
We understand that reestablishing the tribal 
system of governance by elders will not be easy. 
After eight years of doing everything wrong, there 
are no longer any easy solutions in Afghanistan. 
This is simply the least bad one. The tribal system 
has been wounded in many areas of the country, 
but not fatally in most cases. Hundreds of elders 
have been killed, others have sought the compara-
tive safety of larger cities. But the Pashtun have 
no chiefs, no tribal “leaders.” Unlike Iraq, there 
are no tribal sheiks. Jirgas are egalitarian circles 
of elders in which all men are equal. Thus if the 
deforming pressure is removed, the traditional 
balance of the society will gradually rebound in 
most places. Cultures are inherently resilient and 
resistant to change. Furthermore, the argument that 
restoring the tribal system might not be possible in 
all rural communities is a poor argument for doing 
it in none of them. 
Instead of discarding this “pair of tens” of a 
legitimate tribal governance and trying to draw an 
inside straight to a hopelessly corrupt, incompetent 
and illegitimate national government, the United 
States should be working to build on this potentially 
winning hand—before the stakes 
reach the point where eight years 
of bad choices make the options 
of folding and staying in the game 
equally ruinous, just exactly as 
they did in Vietnam. 
A Way Forward  
Taken From the Past
Almost all American infantry 
officers we have interviewed in 
rural Afghanistan or just returned 
from rural operations agree that, 
at the tactical level of war, the 
United States is trapped in the 
kind of Groundhog Day loop 
(as in the Bill Murray film) 
epitomized by the paradigmatic 
tragedy of Hamburger Hill in 
Vietnam. Instead of “clear, hold 
and build,” what the U.S. is doing 
can be characterized as: “clear, return to FOB; clear, 
return to FOB; clear, return to FOB.” 
“Clear, hold, and build” is failing in Afghanistan 
for the same reasons it failed in Vietnam—because 
it is sequenced and linear—i.e., first, clear; then 
hold; then build. It is obvious to everyone that this 
is not actually working, because there’s no subse-
quent holding, and almost no real building in the 
Pashtun areas. (In fact, the Taliban have burned 
down schools faster than we could build them since 
2002, and because of a lack of on-site quality con-
trol mechanisms, much of what we have built since 
2002 has already fallen down.) As in Vietnam, the 
local security forces, which the United States relies 
on to do the holding, are incapable of doing so and 
will be for at least a decade. In Vietnam, these were 
the “RF-PF,” or Ruff-Puffs. In Afghanistan, we’re 
pinning our hopes on the Afghan National Police, 
the most universally hated and corrupt organization 
in the country, or the new “tribal militias” concept, 
another extraordinarily bad idea.  But international 
forces are the only element that can provide the 
stable and reliable guarantee of district security 
necessary to break the Groundhog Day loop and 
enable all three functions—clearing, holding, and 
building—to take place simultaneously. 
The best vehicle for this, based on the success 
of the CORDS program in Vietnam and the chas-
UH-1D helicopters airlift members of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment 
from the Filhol Rubber Plantation area to a new staging area, during Operation 
“Wahiawa,” a search and destroy mission conducted by the 25th Infantry Division, 




12 November-December 2009  MILITARY REVIEW 
sis of the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) 
model in Afghanistan, is to push the PRT structure 
down to the districts, the level of primary political 
importance in Afghanistan. The PRT concept has 
proven itself to function as a military element, but 
the PRTs have been irrelevant at the strategic level 
of war. Established by Big Army as a token gesture 
at reconstruction, they are simply too few and far 
between. Having an average of one PRT in the south 
and east for every 1.2 million Pashtuns in abject 
poverty, as the current ratio stands, may provide a 
valuable experiment in civil-military operations, but 
is obviously absurd as the platform for meaningful 
development and security. The primary reason so few 
American troops are engaged in the most important 
mission in Afghanistan is that officers get promoted 
by demonstrating maneuver skills, not carrying out 
static missions. This kind of institutional mentality is 
difficult to change, as soldier-scholars from Andrew 
Krepinevich to John Nagl have pointed out. 
But the route to victory in Afghanistan, as the 
PROVN report indicated about Vietnam, is to 
change the strategy. The best way to do this, given 
the number of forces we have to work with, is to 
leverage our superiority in protecting troops with 
firepower and supplying them by helicopter to 
stand up roughly 200 district reconstruction teams 
(DRTs). There should be one in each district in the 
south and east, modeled on the PRT civilian mili-
tary structure—not dabbling with an experimental 
handful of six or eight such DRTs, which will cause 
the enemy little trouble and allow him to work out 
countermeasures. We could leverage our enormous 
national engineering, logistic, and organizational 
supremacy to swarm the enemy with hundreds 
of them nearly simultaneously. The reliable local 
security thus provided, combined with efforts to 
reinforce the political primacy of the elders, could 
begin to allow the reemergence of their traditional 
and legitimate authority and leadership and create 
a self-reinforcing spiral of success. 
Because ultimately Afghans must take ownership 
of their war, there will have to be one major change 
to the structure of PRTs. At the district level, there 
must be a very obvious Afghan face on the mission. 
The international element of security, some 70 or 
80 American men and women, should be discreetly 
at the center of concentric rings of security, with 
police “security” in the outer ring outside the FOB, 
and the Afghan National Army in the middle ring 
inside the FOB providing the visible security. The 
locals will know the Americans are there, able to call 
in fire support for the Afghan army (and the local 
base) if necessary, but serving as the hidden “big 
stick” of the local forces while they, the local forces, 
have the confidence to conduct security operations 
in support of the local tribal leaders. In fact, with 
a 100-man ANA presence at each, these DRTs can 
have somewhat fewer American personnel than the 
existing PRTs. Two hundred DRTs of 80 American 
personnel each would require roughly 16,000 men 
and women, about one quarter of the U.S. force in 
country at the end of 2009, even without the 40,000 
more troops General McChrystal has requested. 
A garrison of 100 ANA troops at each one would 
require about half of the roughly 32,000 ANA 
combat soldiers still actually present for duty. Thus, 
the United States does not have a force size problem 
so much as a force distribution problem. The United 
States does not need more troops in Afghanistan so 
much as it needs to redistribute some of the tens of 
thousands of rear area troops to where they can be 
more usefully employed.
However, the military cannot deploy DRTs alone. 
Counterinsurgency is axiomatically “ninety percent 
political and ten percent military.” Successful imple-
mentation would require the State Department to 
begin to take the war in Afghanistan seriously, a tall 
order. There are currently more Foreign Service offi-
cers working in Rome, for example, than there are in 
southern and eastern Afghanistan. In Vietnam, there 
were hundreds of Foreign Service officers deployed 
in country at any given time after 1968. In southern 
Afghanistan today, there are less than 20. Six hundred 
to 800 Pashto-speaking State and U.S. Agency for 
International Development Foreign Service officers 
distributed among the 200 district reconstruction 
teams would be commensurate with the level of 
effort required. In the eight years since the start 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, only 13 Foreign 
Service officers have been trained to speak Pashto, 
and only two of them are apparently in Afghanistan 
…the PRTs have been irrelevant 
at the strategic level of war…
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today, a pathetic counterinsurgency effort by the State 
Department by any reasonable standard.
We should not link the DRT strategy to the exist-
ing Afghanistan National Development Strategy or 
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance 
and the National Solidarity Program, whose task 
is the “establishment and strengthening of local 
governing structures” such as Community Devel-
opment Councils. These councils increase conflict 
and instability and should be terminated.39 The 
lessons of Vietnam are again written on the wall: 
pacification programs like Operation Sunrise (the 
“strategic hamlets” program) failed largely because 
of centrally directed bureaucratic incompetence and 
insensitivity to local considerations. The DRTs must 
drive the local bus, not out-of-touch bureaucrats in 
Kabul. The strategy must be decentralized, bottom-
up security and long-term nation building, based on 
traditional tribal leadership and legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
The Vietnam and Afghan wars are remarkably 
similar at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of war. Most historians today agree the 
conflict in Vietnam was inexorably lost because of 
failure on two deadly, intersecting axes:
 ● The inability to establish legitimacy of gover-
nance which the rural population would prefer as an 
alternative to the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
enough to risk their lives for.
 ● The failure of American troops to protect the 
people and isolate them from the insurgents by 
pursuing instead a war of attrition. 
The same fatal axes of failure loom before the 
United States now in Afghanistan, and time is running 
out. The United States has perhaps the duration of this 
presidential administration remaining before NATO 
peels away, the Afghan and American populations 
grow tired of the U.S. engagement (a process which 
has already begun), and the Taliban consolidates its 
jihad into a critical mass as it did in 1996. It is not 
possible to create a legitimate national government 
in that time. A ceremonial monarchy would have 
provided the necessary traditional legitimacy for an 
elected government in Kabul, but since the Afghan 
monarchy was eliminated by the U.S. and the U.N. 
against the express wishes of more than three-quarters 
of the delegates at the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 
(the single most foolish act of the war and the Afghan 
equivalent of the Diem coup in 1963), the United 
States must now embrace the only remaining secular 
alternative to the religious legitimacy of the Taliban—
the traditional legitimacy of local tribal leadership.
As Andrew Krepinevich noted in The Army in 
Vietnam, counterinsurgency success begins with 
protecting the people, not conducting search and 
destroy missions.40 But it is the rural people you 
have to protect. The bureaucratic inertia of stay-
ing the political course will result in failure in 
Afghanistan as it did in Vietnam. The United States 
can succeed most quickly and most efficiently by 
solving the second axis of failure, that of isolating 
the insurgents from the rural populace by creating 
approximately 200 district reconstruction teams on 
the proven PRT chassis, one in each district in the 
south and east where the war is raging. 
The district level is the only level of personal 
identity which matters in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan. By providing steady, reliable, 24/7 
security in every district, led by an Afghan National 
Army component, and protecting the people from 
the ravages of both the Taliban and the Afghan 
Police with on-site American mentors and trainers, 
the traditional social preeminence of tribal elders 
will gradually reemerge and reestablish itself in 
most areas. The tribal structure is wounded, but not 
yet fatally. The rural villages are still full of 50- to 
60-year-old men who sat in the jirgas and salah-
mashwarahs thirty years ago as 20- to 30-year-old 
men, and they know how it’s supposed to work. 
Indeed, they want it to work, but they need security 
to make it happen.
As the system gradually comes back into bal-
ance, the radical mullahs will return to their right-
ful places as the religious advisors and spiritual 
guides for their communities, rather than remain 
the radical leaders they are now. This is how jihads 
on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier end. We have to 
understand the enemy before we can defeat him.
In 1983, Arnold Isaacs summarized the reasons 
for failure in Vietnam in his history of the final years 
of the war as follows: 
From start to finish, American leaders 
remained catastrophically ignorant of Viet-
namese history, culture, values, motives, 
and abilities. Misperceiving both its enemy 
and its ally, and imprisoned in the myopic 
conviction that sheer military force could 
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somehow overcome adverse political cir-
cumstances, Washington stumbled from 
one failure to the next in the continuing 
delusion that success was always just 
ahead. This ignorance and false hope were 
mated, in successive administrations, with 
bureaucratic circumstances that inhibited 
admission of error and made it always seem 
safer to keep repeating the same mistakes, 
rather than risk the unknown perils of a 
different policy.41
One could again substitute the word “Afghan” 
for “Vietnamese” in Isaac’s assessment and apply 
it with equal precision to the U.S. effort in Afghani-
stan from 2001 to 2009. The current dual-pronged 
strategy of nation building from the nonexistent 
top down and a default war of attrition is leading 
us down the same tragic path. MR
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